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Recent Developments
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson:
SEXUAL HARASSMENT FOUND
TO BE A FORM OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION UNDER 1964
CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 106
S.Ct. 2399 (1986), the United States Supreme Court held that a claim of "hostile
environment" sexual harassment is a form
of sex discrimination actionable under
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Court stated that even though employers are not always automatically liable
for sexual harassment by their supervisors,
the employer may be held liable under
Title VII, even witho~t notice of the harassment.
Michelle Vinson had been an employee
of Meritor Savings Bank from 1974 to
1978. Sydney Taylor, a vice-president and
branch manager of the bank, hired her and
supervised her throughout her years of
employment. She advanced, based on
merit alone, from teller-trainee to assistant
branch manager. In September 1978 Vinson took an indefinite sick leave until November 1,1978, when she was discharged
for excessive use of that leave.
After her discharge, Vinson brought this
action against her former employer, asserting that Taylor had constantly subjected
her to sexual harassment during her employment at the bank, thereby violating
Title VII. She claimed that although she
had voluntarily engaged in sexual relations
with Taylor, she did so because of fear of
losing her job. Taylor and the bank each
denied the charges. Furthermore, the bank
said that if the actions complained of had
occurred, they had not been done with its
approval.
The United States District Court for the
District of Columbia found that a sexual
harassment claim did not exist unless there
was an economic effect on the employee, a
tangible economic loss. Justice Rehnquist
delivered the Court's opinion and rejected
that reasoning, as had the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia. Rehnquist
noted that violation of Title VII may be
based on one of two types of sexual harassment. Either the harassment may have an
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economic effect in that it involves the "conditioning of concrete employment benefits
on sexual favors," or it may have the effect
of creating a "hostile or offensive working
environment," although not affecting economic benefits. Id. at 2403.
Sexual harassment allegations, in this
case, were sufficient to state a claim for
"hostile environment" sexual harassment,
according to the Court. Specifically, ViI)-son's allegations that Taylor made repeated
demands for sexual favors, followed her
into the ladies' room when she went there
alone, exposed himself to her, forcibly
raped her, and fondled her in front ofothers
were actions severe enough to create an
abusive work environment and a cause of
action for "hostile environment" sexual
harassment.
In addressing the sexual harassment
claim, the Court relied on two significant
cases, one regarding discriminatory work
environment, Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d
234 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
957 (1972), and the other applying discrimination in the work environment to
discrimination based on sex, Henson v.
Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982).
Courts first recognized discriminatory
work environment as a cause of action in
Rogers. In that case, involving a Hispanic
plaintiff alleging discrimination, the court
explained that under Title VII an employee's protections extended beyond the
economic aspect of employment. Following Rogers, courts have applied this principle to harassment based on race, religion,
and national origin. Meritor Savings Bank
v. Vinson, 106 S.Ct. at 2405. In the case
before it, the Supreme Court reasoned that
similarly a "hostile environment based on
discriminatory sexual harassment should
... be likewise prohibited" (emphasis in
original). Id.
In Henson, the Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit recognized that "[s]exual
harassment which creates a hostile or offensive environment for members of one
sex is every bit the arbitrary barrier to sexual equality at the workplace that racial
harassment is to racial equality." Id. at
2046.
Yet both the Rogers and Henson cases

recognized that not all workplace conduct
which is classified as "harassment" affects
the aspects of employment required within
the meaning of Title VII. For sexual harassment to be actionable, the Court relied
on the Henson explanation that it must be
"sufficiently severe or pervasive so that the
conditions of employment are altered and
an abusive working environment is created." Id. In this case, however, the court
concluded that the allegations were sufficient to create a claim for "hostile environment" sexual harassment.
The Supreme Court also rejected the
District Court's theory that because the
sex-related conduct was "voluntary," i.e.,
complainant was not forced to participate
against her will, it was not sexual harassment. Justice Rehnquist said that "[t]he
correct inquiry is whether respondent by
her conduct indicated that the alleged sexual advances were unwelcome, not whether
the actual participation in sexual intercourse was voluntary." Id. This is so because the sex-related conduct could be
"voluntary" in that the party was not forced
to participate against her will. Therefore,
the critical point is that the sexual advances were ''unwelcome.'' Id.
In a final point regarding the "hostile environment" claim, the Court held that evidence of the claimant's sexually provocative speech or dress is not inadmissible per
se. In fact, in this case it would be relevant
because the existence of sexual harassment
must be determined in view of the totality
of the circumstances and in light of the
record as a whole. Therefore, the nature of
the sexual advances and the context within
which they occurred would be relevant.
When addressing the issue of employer
liability, the Court declined to issue a definitive ruling regarding the matter. The
Court applied agency principles and considered Congressional intent when it held
that employers are not always automatically
liable for sexual harassment by their employees. Nor does absence of notice to an
employer of the supervisor's sexual harassment protect the employer from liability.
In this case, however, the Court found the
bank liable. First, the existence of a bank
policy against discrimination was not suf-

ficient to protect the bank because the
policy did not address sexual harassment.
The policy therefore failed to notify employees of the employer's interest in avoiding that form of discrimination. Second,
the mere existence of a grievance procedure
within the bank was insufficient to protect
the bank against liability because the procedure required an employee to complain
to her supervisor first. In this case, the
employee would have had to complain to
the alleged perpetrator, which she understandably failed to do. The Court left the
door open regarding the rulings on employer's liability in the future. It even suggested that if the employer's "procedures
were better calculated to encourage victims
of harassment to come forward" the employer may be able to avoid liability. ld.
at 2409.
Justice Marshall delivered the concurring opinion, joined by Justices Brennan,
Blackmun, and Stevens. They agreed that
workplace sexual harassment is illegal and
violates Title VII. As regards employer
liability, however, the justices concluded
that "sexual harassment by a supervisor of
an employee under his supervision, leading to a discriminatory work environment,
should be imputed to the employer for
Title VII purposes, regardless of whether
the employee gave 'notice' of the offense."
ld. at 2411.
Based on the Court's holding there may
be problems in the future concerning proof
of whether conduct was "unwelcome" or
"voluntary." Also, the issue of employer
liability in sexual harassment cases has
been left open, although the Court has
indicated that future cases should apply
agency principles.

-Libby C. Reamer

Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser: FIRST AMENDMENT DOES
NOT PREVENT SCHOOL DISTRICT
FROM DISCIPLINING STUDENT
FOR GIVING OFFENSIVELY LEWD
AND INDECENT SPEECH
In Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District, 393 U.S. 503
(1969), the Supreme Court of the United
States acknowledged that students do not
"shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate." ld. at 506. Recently, however,
the Court held that a school district acted
entirely within its permissible authority in
imposing sanctions upon a high school
student in response to the student's offensively lewd and indecent speech given at a
school assembly. The Court held that such
speech was not protected by the first amendment. Bethel School District No. 403 v.
Fraser, 106 S.Ct. 3159 (1986).
Matthew Fraser was a high school student in Bethel, Washington. At a school
assembly attended by about 600 students,
many of whom were 14 years ofage, Fraser
delivered a speech in support of a candidate for student government office. The
speech referred to the candidate in terms
of explicit sexual metaphors, employing
such phrases as "he's firm in his pants ...
his character is firm," "a man who takes his
point and pounds it in," and "a man who
will go to the very end - even the climax,
for each and every one of you." ld. at 3167.
Students at the assembly hooted and yelled
during the speech, mimicking the sexual activities alluded to in the speech, while
others appeared to be shocked and embarrassed. Prior to Fraser's delivery of the
speech, two of his teachers with whom he
had discussed the contents of his speech
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in advance, advised him that it was inappropriate and should not be given.
The day after he delivered the speech,
Fraser was asked to report to the assistant
principal's office. At the meeting, Fraser
was given notice that he was being charged
with violating the school's disruptive conduct rule, which prohibited conduct that
substantially interfered with the educational process, including the use of obscene, profane language or gestures. After
being given an opportunity to explain his
conduct, in which he admitted that he delibenitely used sexual innuendos in the
speech, Fraser was suspended for three
days. In addition, he was informed that his
name would be removed from a list of candidates on a ballot for graduation speakers.
Fraser initiated a grievance of the disciplinary action through the school district's grievance procedures. The hearing
officer affirmed the decision but Fraser
was allowed to return to school after serving only two days of his suspension. Fraser,
joined by his father as guardian ad litem,
then filed a civil rights action in federal
district court, seeking injunctive relief
and monetary damages under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court, holding that
the sanctions violated the student's rights
under the first and fourteenth amendments, awarded Fraser monetary damages
and enjoined the school district from preventing him from speaking at graduation.
Fraser was elected graduation speaker and
spoke at the commencement ceremonies.
The United States Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court judgment, rejecting the argument
that the nomination speech had a disruptive effect on the educational process. The
court also rejected the argument that the
school district had an interest in protecting
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